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There is a joke about two rabbis, which I’ll set between two cardinals because it reminds me of 
Lenny Bruce on Cardinals Spellman and Shehan encountering Moses and Jesus. The first 
cardinal, head bowed, walks toward the cross over an altar. There, he proclaims, “Oh suffering 
path of the cross, before this I am nothing!” A second cardinal, his colleague, crosses around the 
back, and, never taking his eyes off the altar, murmurs in the direction of the cross, “Oh, life of 
our savior, that I could imitate this life, but I am merely dust and ashes.” They solemnly prepare 
to leave, backing up. Once at the door, they see a little fellow, the janitor it seems, kneel down 
before the altar, saying, “ah sinner that I am, an eternal cipher.” The one cardinal looks at the 
other and says, “Now look who says he’s nothing!”  
This joke might be told by phenomenologists, with Levinas occasionally playing 
the part of the janitor. But janitor or not, his intuitions into intersubjectivity, passions, and 
traumatic affects, have haunted since his death a great deal of French phenomenology, 
notably at the Husserl Archives in Paris.  
In many places Levinas will say things like: “Our presentation of notions…remains 
faithful to intentional analysis, in so far as it signifies locating notions in the horizon of 
their appearing, a horizon unrecognized, forgotten or displaced in the exhibition of an 
object” (OBBE 183 [n.7]). Or again, responding to Theo de Boer in 1975: “It is not the 
word ‘transcendental’ that I would keep, but the notion of intentional analysis. I think 
that, in spite of everything, what I do is phenomenology, even if…all of Husserl’s 
methodology is not respected” (OGM 87 [n.20]). This is not fanciful, not an appeal to his 
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interlocutor, nor is this Levinas brandishing Husserlian party papers to counter 
Heidegger…  
So, why is Levinas’s “exteriority,” for example, why is the face that he describes as 
pre-intentional, resistant to constitution because not directly perceived—and why is all 
this dismissed as “smoke and mirrors” or surreptitious God-talk? As if Levinas were not 
Jewish, as though a Jewish thinker would try sneak “god” into a human face, into 
incarnation… It’s been done; I think it’s called messianism, and Levinas is a rationalist, a 
mittnagdist. 
I. So what is the point of my article?  
Basically, to show this: that Levinas, as a critical reader of Husserl, worked 
‘phenomenologically’ by exploiting four ambiguities in Husserl’s thought. 
These ambiguities are as follows, they structure this presentation: 
1. Husserl’s evolving conception of Einfühlung, alternately translated as 
intropathy or empathy; better, perhaps, would be in-feeling.  
2. Husserl’s crucial distinction between perception and apperception, where 
“apperception” denotes what is co-given horizonally with perception, or: 
what you see and retain even if you’re not paying attention to it at a given 
time.  
3. Husserl’s conception of pre-objective time, as the temporizing flow of 
consciousness, with at least its three aspects or ec-stases, its stretchings: 
retention, protention, and the standing-streaming present.  
4. Finally, he exploits Husserl’s 1918-1927 research into passive synthesis, 
and notably into spontaneous association, memory, and affective forces. 
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No need to add that Husserl’s towering thought itself evolved, notably on 
points 1 and 4. James Dodd can teach us a lot about point 3.  
Didier Franck once referred to the communication of phenomenology as a 
dramatique des phénomènes, a dramatic exemplification of what is meant to enhance 
phenomenological intelligibility or, as Hegel once said, to avoid the “impatience of the 
concept” when the concept is prematurely detached from what is concrete.”1 This 
“paradigmatic method,” as Levinas calls it, is also found in Talmudic reflection. So let 
me offer two micro-paradigms: the first, from Hegel; the second will be Husserl’s ‘re-
thinking’ of Hegel.  
First then, from Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology, ¶¶174 and 179: 
“The simple ‘I’ is this genus…for which the differences are not differences only by its 
being the negative essence of the shaped independent moments [negatives Wesen der 
gestaltenden selbständigen Momente]; and self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only 
by superseding this other that presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life; 
self-consciousness is Desire [Begierde]. Certain of the nothingness of this other 
[consciousness], it explicitly affirms that this nothingness is for it the truth of [that] other; 
it destroys the independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true 
certainty, a certainty which has become explicit for self-consciousness itself in an 
objective manner [gegenständliche Weise]” (emph Hegel’s). 
Obviously, one cannot simply excerpt a passage from Hegel’s dialectic of two self-
consciousnesses; it neither begins nor ends there. After all, this is the path to “Spirit,” 
toward the “I that is a we”, and toward intersubjective formations like the state. But note 
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here that the evolving self-consciousness negates—it desires, consumes, subjugates—
things and beings, which thereby gives it the “certainty of itself as a true certainty.” Up to 
now, it is self-certainty largely in-itself, but not for-itself. Hegel adds, ¶179:  
“Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness;2 it has come out 
of itself. This has a twofold significance: first, it has lost itself, for it finds 
itself as an other being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other [es 
hat damit das Andere aufgehoben], for it does not see the other as an essential 
being, but in the other sees its own self” (last itals mine). 
Still not a self-consciousness in and for-itself, it will be through the resistance of the 
other, that self-consciousness A ceases to see in this other its own self, and is compelled 
to recognize B as an autonomous self-consciousness apt to “recognize” and hopefully 
serve A. 
There is much to say about these passages, but note here that what drives the simple 
‘I’s quest is called Desire (Begierde) (we might add “will”).3 Indeed, Desire defines self-
consciousness; it is its life and its effectivity.  
I’ll now pass to the second drame, from Husserl’s 1927 notes, entitled “The 
Phenomenological Reduction to the Alter-Ego and to Intersubjectivity.” This is rather late 
work, written at a time when he was also exploring his famous double reduction. Husserl 
writes 
“I have the experience of others as my fellows”… and he adds, “Guided by 
the expression of the foreign subjectivity, in its fleshly corporeity that 
appears to me, I posit precisely the existence of this foreign subjectivity.” 
Although the “foreign subjectivity is increasingly unified with mine” (Hua 
14, 400 [No. 21]), its basic “strangeness is never lost” (Hua 15, 631). But 
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intersubjective contact opens onto action and this implies that “my will is 
consciously, at the same time in the will of the other, and vice-versa. This is 
particularly clear in the example of the establishment of a master-servant 
relationship” (Hua 14, 403), because, at the transcendental level, “my will 
[becomes] one with that of the other” (Hua 14 402).  
In these two “primal” or paradigmatic scenes, you can see differences, though both logics 
are guided by the possibility of “Spirit” emerging, that I that is also a we. Absent in 
Husserl is Hegel’s dualism of an sich and für sich, as well as Hegel’s dynamic Begierde. 
Husserl starts from “my fellows,” my Mitmenschen. And as absent as desire seems to be, 
patent is the practical passage of willing between the two figures. “My will becomes one 
with that of the other.” This carrying over of wills occurs thanks to communication, as 
well as Einfühlung and pairing (Paarung), which, by 1927 are a spontaneous, passive 
association that belongs to what Husserl calls “my inner sphere.” Nevertheless, there 
remains an evolving limit on how integrally I can constitute the foreign (embodied) 
consciousness.  
Note immediately that the English term “empathy” may not capture how passive 
and comprehensive Husserl’s Einfühlung is in 1927. By 1932, five years later, Husserl 
will add that “when we understand each other in a unilateral way or in a reciprocal mode 
(according to empathic experience), then this amounts—if empathy becomes an intuitive 
appresentation—to producing…a ‘covering’ between me and the other, [and this] 
covering…is something entirely new (Hua 15 471, emph added).  
The limit placed on constituting the other, the absolute quality of the other 
consciousness that Husserl once embraced, is as if set questioned, set afloat in this 
6 
 
‘covering’, even if it is only the covering of our two bodies. This is again the working of 
empathy, not desire, not the negative.  
 
Here, I need to make a contextual remark: Husserl’s approach to Einfühlung 
easily spans two decades. It begins with his confrontation with the Munich 
phenomenologist Theodor Lipps (1851–1914), for whom empathy arose out of two basic 
human ‘instincts’: the drive of Life to express or externalize itself and the mimetic drive 
(Triebe der Äußerung and the Triebe der Nachahmung). For Lipps, empathy ‘takes 
place’, actively and cognitively, when I perceive another’s expression, imagine myself 
making that expression, and transfer what I feel back onto the other person.4 Husserl was 
familiar with the Munich school, which he initially considered “psychologistic” rather 
than truly phenomenological. As early as 1913, Husserl expressed doubts about how far 
we can really access the other’s affects and immanent states through empathic 
constitution. That is, how can we perform an analogical constitution of the other’s state of 
mind when we do not even see our own externalizations, our own expressions, our own 
Äußerungen? Worse, Lipps’ theory of empathy argued that we could feel our egoic 
subject in a foreign body, which supposed that Lipps understood what an ego was and 
how it developed. He could say nothing about constituting the layers and a priori laws of 
the ego’s development, so Lipps’ egoic subjectivity had really not moved past empirical 
psychology. So much for Husserl’s 1913 reticence about empathy. A Levinasian might 
also note the important limit set on constituting the other.  
A year later, in notes from 1914, Husserl argued that Einfühlung, as he understood 
it, belonged above all to apperception, or indirect perception (which Levinas will praise 
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as Husserl’s discovery of “horizons”). Apperceptively, the affects and states of mind of 
the other are indirectly co-given with my perception of their moving body. But already 
Husserl had moved a little closer to Lipps, asking:  
What “lies” in the way in which the external appearance [Erscheinung] 
functions apperceptively? I am referred to my ‘here’, to which the external 
appearing of my body [Körpers] is referred, as well as to the inner appearance 
that accompanies it, into which the external appearance must be translated… 
[This] internal appearance is the analogon of that inner appearance which 
would result if I set my body over there [where the other stands], and likewise 
my external bodily appearance, which would go from here over to there, is 
analogous to the external appearance that I have of that body…” (Hua 
13, 336).  
 Co-given with the appearance of the other person, “over there,” who shares the 
space around my moving body, is something of their internal appearance, presumably 
some state of mind. But what lies therein, asks Husserl, outside of my kinesthetic body 
and its feelings, and how do I grasp, in “the external appearing” of the other, that their 
states might actually be analogous to my states?  
 By 1914, one sees Husserl’s growing rapprochement with Lipps, which is part of 
a long and fascinating journey. This rapprochement follows the unfolding of Husserl’s 
genetic phenomenology and his extensive notes on intersubjectivity, taken from 1905 
through 1935. Now, in 1908, the other had been qualified as being “absolute.”5  I posit 
that other, Husserl wrote, as “an absolute being.” You can see that, initially, the defining 
limit that Levinas sets on “constituting” another person phenomenologically, is also 
found in Husserl, albeit for different reasons—notably, eidetic integrity. For Husserl, 
what I invariably ‘see’ is a body ‘over there’ and various behaviors. In 1961, Levinas 
speaks in terms of the ungraspable expression of the other: “[the face] does not manifest 
itself by . . . qualities, but kath’ auto. It expresses itself…. [T]he notion of the face 
8 
 
[thus]… opens other perspectives: it brings us to a notion of meaning prior to my 
Sinngebung [meaning bestowal]…” (TI 51).  
 So much for Levinas, whose perplexing concept of “exteriority” could be seen as 
a strict limit set on the constitution of the other—at least, initially, before intentionality 
gives us what he called the “third party.” But between 1921 and 1928, Husserl’s notes on 
intersubjectivity presented new constitutions of interpersonal encounters, calling them on 
two occasions “the I and Thou.” (Incidentally, Buber’s book appeared in 1923, in the 
middle of this period). Something like Levinas’s phenomenology of expression would 
henceforth depend, for Husserl, both on apperception and the operation of Einfühlung and 
pairing (Paarung). Yet working at the eidetic level implied that Husserl describe fully 
“the original sphere” of the ego, in which this Einfühlung unfolded passively.6 Within this 
original sphere we find the transcendental consciousness: the flowing pre-objective 
temporalizing that invariably features ‘now moments’, a larger sphere of the living 
present that contains all that flows back from the now-moments even as it anticipates 
what is immediately to-come, and the original sphere contains recollections and phantasy. 
By the 1920s, I repeat, empathy was expressly part of this original sphere. Let me turn 
briefly to the complex temporalizing that belongs to, and even characterizes this 
“sphere”. 
The work on what Husserl called “absolute subjectivity” (Hua 10, 74-75) was 
underway starting from 1905, only to be vastly enriched in 1917 by the Bernau 
Manuscripts on which James Dodd has written beautifully. Let me just add of 
transcendental subjectivity that the flow just mentioned “streams” as much as it “stands”. 
That is, the living present is always dynamically ‘there’ even as it presumably flows all 
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the way back to my earliest experience. Later, Husserl will say that the ego streams along 
with the flow of time consciousness. The ego lives in all experienced states of 
consciousness (C Ms). There is, as you can see, an uninterrupted, what Levinas would 
call a totalizing quality to “absolute subjectivity” (although not clearly to Lipps’ 
psychologistic subjectivity or even to the “empirical” ego). And this will pose Husserl 
other difficulties, such as: how far back does consciousness really flow, or again: does the 
flow that is absolute subjectivity stop flowing when it reaches a certain degree of 
‘pastness’? Or again, what is it that preserves certain contents of our retentions while not 
retaining others? And finally, as Husserl jotted in one of his famous afterthoughts called 
the “Beilage” to the notes on passive synthesis: “the constitution of time cannot be 
founded alone on the possibility of awakening recollection anew, in infinitum. Something 
else in intersubjectivity?..,” (Hua 11 379).  
These questions, addressing Husserl’s increasingly complex approach to 
transcendental consciousness, understood as ‘temporization’, as positionally stable and 
dynamic—these were all important to the later Levinas, of Otherwise than Being. By 
exploiting ambiguities in Husserl’s discussion of what moved the flow (sensation), 
Levinas would argue that Husserl’s was perhaps not the only basic structure of “time 
consciousness,” and that the traumatizing impact of being under the gaze of the other, of 
being singled out, flows back, sediments certainly, but recurs as memories that have the 
amorphous form of troubling affects. In 1974, Levinas called these recurrences: 
“obsession,” “persecution,” and “substitution.” Affectivity, understood broadly as 
anything that ultimately attracts the attention of my ego, this affectivity might not enter 
neatly into the standing-streaming of Husserl’s pre-objective temporalizing 
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consciousness. To get to his argument, however, Levinas had to plumb the ambiguities 
arising in Husserl’s work on passive syntheses; notably, I think, what made “association” 
—whether by fusion or by contrast—possible, and along with association, memory and 
the affective forces in our retentions themselves. 
 Let me pause for a moment and address an ambiguity which I think Levinas was 
aware of, since he examined it in a 1965 essay called “Intentionalité et sensation.” I don’t 
know how much Levinas knew of Husserl’s significant 1917 rethinking of his 1905 time 
consciousness lectures. I don’t know if Levinas met Edith Stein and discussed her 
conception of empathy when he was in Freiburg in 1928. I do know that James Dodd has 
pondered the relationship between Husserl’s 1905 approach to time consciousness and 
his revisions in the Bernau Manuscripts. The point is that in 1905 Husserl offered right 
triangular depictions of time consciousness to illustrate the vertical ‘sinking down’ of 
temporal phases (E to P’ to A’) and the horizontal passage of sequential now-moments, 
with their protentions and retentions (A to E, with protentions not indicated). This 
prompted debates about whether Husserl could really open access, reflectively and after 
the fact, to the pure structure of transcendental subjectivity, in its immediacy and as the a 
priori norm underlying all our lived experiences consisting of intentional aiming and 
object donation. A lot of ink has flowed on this debate, which concerns in part the status 
and accessibility of transcendental immanence and immediacy. But perhaps it is enough 
to say, here, that Levinas was interested above all in the conundrum of “sensation” with 
regard to the temporalizing flow, where sensation and flow are understood somewhat 
analogously to primitive matter and form. Levinas stated his interest in the form of a 
question, one that Husserl also wrestled with. That is, does the material of our sensations, 
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does the materiality that is sensation, propel the ongoing ‘transcendental’ flow, as each 
‘new’ sensation wells up and is subtly modified, or must we admit that the flow of 
consciousness is what makes sensation possible formally, once it has become an affect 
that can attract the attention of the ego? If the second is the case, if the universal form of 
intentionality is primary, then pre- or proto-conscious sensation is unavailable to us, and 
a formal dynamic unity becomes primary because it structures sensation allowing it to 
enter consciousness. If the first is the case, then sensation, which fuels the flow, comes 
both before and after its own structuring as conscious awareness. It had to be somewhere, 
in process, before I was aware of it, and it is as as conscious awareness that I ‘experience’ 
it. 
Following Levinas’s 1965 essay, which he concluded simply enough by praising 
Husserl’s “idealistic” approach, his 1974 work entitled Otherwise than Being, exploited 
the ambiguity that James Dodd has expressed this way: “implicit in every lived 
experience is the living through of that experience as its ‘origin’” (RHTD, 117). Again, 
and in other words, can the implicit be made explicit without denaturing it or forcing it 
into what reflection conceives it to be? With regard to sensation welling up into 
consciousness, how shall we approach chaotic, amorphous sensations and affects? In 
Otherwise than Being, Levinas contested the ultimacy of an uninterrupted living-through, 
a totalizing transcendental consciousness as sole origin of experience. Moreover, despite 
his protesting to Theo de Boer about Husserl’s recourse to a certain “transcendental” 
level (itself debated by people like Dan Zahavi and John Brough on time 
consciousness)—despite Levinas’s protesting, he seeks a pre-reflective, co-temporalizing 
that would be specific to certain affects or perhaps even, to speak like Husserl in the 
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passive syntheses, shot through with affective forces, affective Kräfte. Levinas is also 
aware that retention, those interconnected now-moments that have flowed or stretched 
back and continue to sink and to sediment—he is aware that retention “is only what it is 
thanks to an as yet unspecified relation to protention” or spontaneous anticipation 
(RHTD, 121). This is how Dodd put it in 2005, preparing discussion of the innovations of 
the Bernau manuscripts. I like it because it emphasizes, among other things, Husserl’s 
restless, on-going exploration of the so-called transcendental level and his ‘original 
sphere’; it points also to an ambiguity that Levinas may well have known. That is, the 
continuing activity of anticipations, or protentions, even as a given now-moment had 
flowed back, had functionally vanished from view. These two modes of temporalizing 
consciousness, retention and protention, prove to be richly interwoven and account for 
the complexity of consciousness as the precondition for objective time. Protention, active 
here and now, but also ongoingly as the flow continues, points to a Vorbewusstsein, a 
pre-consciousness (I paraphrase Dodd). But this pre-consciousness may have little to no 
content. As anticipation, it may be closer to a feeling. Could this suggest something about 
the recurrence of certain affects, whether as memories that scarcely “congeal” in our 
consciousness or in the wake of an encounter with an “other”? Levinas may have had 
such a thing in mind when he spoke in 1974 of “persecution” and “recurrence.” For now, 
let me just pay homage to Dodd’s article on time consciousness, which is more complex 
than I have indicated, although the ambiguities posed by sensation, and the interweave of 
retentions and protentions, not to mention associations passively welling up in us, 
interested Levinas, on a hermeneutic level that Husserl did not explore for reasons I 
explain in the article. That is, Husserl’s interest in sensibility, understood as affects and 
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valuing (Geschmacksempfindungen) long paralleled his concern with object-constituting 
sensations. Sensation and sensibility were for him isomorphic things. By extension, the 
early grounds of Husserl’s ethics were rationalistic, even intellectualist, and originally 
framed on the cognitive-type approach found in the Logical Investigations (1900-1901). 
In short, Husserl’s concern with ethics did not initially consider Einfühlung, much less 
hermeneutics, and Levinas’s approach to intersubjective affects would not have seemed a 
viable ground for ethics to Husserl.  
I have tried here to set forth, in broad strokes, aspects of Husserl’s approach to 
time consciousness so-called, his approach to “transcendental subjectivity”, and in 
passing acknowledge my debt to James Dodd. However, because the 1917 Bernau 
manuscripts, on temporalizing consciousness and individuation, so complexify this 
picture, I cannot spend more time on them here. I wish I knew whether Levinas was 
familiar with them—even via the story of Edith Stein’s great disappointment when she 
arrived in Bernau, expecting to work with Husserl on the revision of his 1905-1907 time 
consciousness lectures. But Stein had to leave once Husserl essentially vanished into his 
study to write these manuscripts. The picture of what transcendental consciousness is, 
would never be the same after them. What I can say is that Levinas was familiar with 
Husserl’s early work on sensation and time consciousness, as well as with his notes on 
passive synthesis.  
In my initial sketch of Husserl’s 1927 encounter between two consciousnesses, it 
is through Einfühlung, empathy or intropathy, that two wills penetrate each other, and 
thanks to which I come ‘to know’ the other increasingly well, despite their foreignness. 
The 1927 notes belong to Husserl’s late conception of empathy, as pure spontaneity. 
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Arising as apperception, and pre-consciously co-given within any perception, Einfühlung 
belongs to my original sphere as I said, because when I perform an egological reduction, 
I find the other already in my reduced consciousness or my “monad,” as Husserl had 
come to say. He even deliberated about whether a monad might not have “windows” 
causally opened by others. However, although Einfühlung is not tied to passive synthesis 
in Husserl’s definitive Ideas I, published in 1911, Einfühlung did come to be tied closely 
to passivity when Husserl presented his mature phenomenology in the 1928 public 
lectures called the Cartesian Meditations. In those lectures, he argued that in a face-to-
face situation, the spontaneity of apperception entails a carrying-over, an Übertragung, 
from my lived body to the other.  
This carrying-over was primordial, and it certainly corrected Lipps’ cognitive 
empathy and his two mythical drives. Through Übertragung our two bodies coincide 
(Hua 1, 141-43) and I think this coinciding parallels the first degree of association 
through resemblance, which Husserl developed in his notes on passive synthesis. That is, 
associations of resemblant objects facilitate identification, and later on, concept 
formation. But these associations also imply reproductive memory, which is tied to the 
complex interactions of flowing retentions and protentions in transcendental 
consciousness. At a deep level, Husserl ventured (around 1918) that “the phenomenology 
of association is…a higher extension of the doctrine of the originary constitution of time” 
itself (Hua 11, 118). So which comes first, the fact of spontaneous, passive association 
knitting our experiences together, or the transcendental consciousness that flows and is 
always there, standing and streaming? It seems hard to decide. But to return to 
Übertragung, the coinciding of our two bodies occurs thanks to a spontaneous 
15 
 
association, effected passively through the merging of recollection and perception. The 
same applies to apperception, and it too can be scrutinized phenomenologically. Thus, 
association has an encompassing, even an assimilative quality, despite the fact that in the 
case of the other person, a dimension of foreignness holds on. Indeed, as I grasp that the 
other’s body is ‘like mine’, I note that my own, to me partly visible body, must have the 
integrity that the other’s has. It is the perceived unity of the other body that gives me a 
sense of myself as an empirical being—“this person here”—and we can recall Levinas’s 
1961 arguments that the other individuates me; though again, for Levinas, it is through 
the other’s singling me out rather than through association.  
For Husserl, in the ‘now’ of an association through resemblance, there also occurs 
a moment of “self-alienation” (Selbstentfremdung). Beyond questions of self-
objectification, this suggests that in my perception and apperception of the other, I 
momentarily lose something of myself, recognizing that I am squarely in the other’s field 
of vision, even though I do not know his thoughts implicitly. All of this comes to pass—
the spontaneous carrying-over as also the self-alienation—at a deep level of my egoic 
life. As Natalie Depraz argues, self-alienation or Entfremdung, sometimes written with a 
hyphen, “Ent-” “fremdung,” underscores a processual and “structural condition of [my] 
relation to the other person” (TeI 346). The point was not lost on Levinas, even though he 
knew the Cartesian Meditations as their co-translator but maybe less well, Husserl’s  
notes on intersubjectivity from the 1920s. Important here is the echo we hear in the 1974 
Levinas, who introduced his own theme of substitution with the citation from Paul Celan, 




 With apperception and spontaneous Einfühlung, Husserl’s phenomenology of 
intersubjective encounters reaches toward the pure psychology he had already considered 
in his remarkable Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1910-1911). Already there, we see 
that he was interested in more than essences or eidetic constitution.7 This is important 
because some readers scarcely tarry with the Husserl who wrote notes on 
phenomenological psychology and on passive syntheses. Yet if association plays the 
crucial role I alluded to in the unification of consciousness as temporalizing, as standing-
streaming, then the question of how associations occur becomes unavoidable. This opens 
the question of passive synthesis and affective force, something that Levinas took up in 
his own way. Husserl argued that as our lived now-moments flow back as retentions, they 
undergo a process of progressive impoverishment, an ongoing intuitive depletion. There 
is less and less to them. Indeed, depleted of its contents, a retention can actually become 
quite devoid of content and its original affective force almost nil, he argued (Hua 
11 173).  
 At this point in the passive synthesis notes, Husserl makes a strange claim. Empty 
retentions are not nothing. Empty retentions are “zero degrees of awakening”—they are 
the source and origin of associations’ awakening—“comparable,” he says, “to the 
arithmetic zeros…counted nevertheless among the numbers” (Hua 11, 154). Almost 
anything can be awakened out of “empty retentions”; if not by us or at will, then by 
another. By the period 1918-1926, this has become part of the phenomenological 
structure of memory. It is also why Husserl claimed that the foreign quality of the other 
can be compared to the alien quality of some recollections, because even empty 
retentions may occasion the return of a hitherto “lost” memory, although the retention is 
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less a “memory” in itself than the way a present moment, perceived or apperceived, 
stretches indefinitely into my “past,” gradually sedimenting in it—whether intuitively full 
or empty. If it is the loss of affective force that contributes to the emptying of retentional 
contents, then affective force plays a role in how well I perceive and/or recall anything. 
That is, how and what something will awaken in me, invariably passively. I suspect that 
for Levinas, notably in 1974, the encounter with the other person carries a unique 
affective force or intensity. Moreover, if what Levinas calls “recurrence,” “obsession,” 
and “persecution” express the spontaneous passive return of affective forces—as forces 
that do not yet make sense but leave me mal dans ma peau, too tight in my skin—then 
Levinas is elaborating on something we already find in Husserl’s notes on passive 
synthesis: the meaningful succession of temporal phases implies ordered objects 
contributing to a coherent world. Beneath or beside these phases are nevertheless two 
more “chaotic” levels: the “chaos of ‘impressions’ (Eindrücke) in the process of self-
organizing; and the chaos of the connections of our many “sense fields (Sinnesfelder)” 
amongst themselves (Hua 11, 414, Beilage XIX). To the degree that he knew of Husserl’s 
investigations into these deep levels of consciousness, to the degree that they might have 
discussed this two years after the end of the notes on passive synthesis, when Levinas 
studied with Husserl in 1928, to that degree that Otherwise than Being can be said to step 
into the deep level of sensuous chaos, it locates the roots of my affective investiture by 
another, or indeed, as Husserl also understood, by an alien or seemingly senseless 
memory. 
Let me illustrate this and recall that in 1974, Levinas wrote:  
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It is because the assembly of non-signifying elements into a structure, and the 
arrangement of structures into systems or into a totality involves chance or 
delays, and something like bad or good luck since the finitude of being is not 
only due to the fate that destines the way it carries on [toward meaningful] 
manifestation…[it is because of this chance and these delays] that subjectivity 
in retention, memory, and history intervenes to hasten the elements into a 
present, to re-present them. (OBBE, 133-134, trans mod.) 
 
The intervention of “subjectivity” to forge meaning is a passive process for Husserl. But 
that some dimension of the subject proves able to order these “non-signifying elements 
into a structure,” that is already idealism. It may well be the case in practice, but it does 
not justify our overlooking the affective elements, or forces, that come to pass in 
intersubjective encounters and in traumatic memories. That is Levinas’s wager. Our 
purely passive “ability” to “totalize” bathes in Husserl’s chaos of sensuous fields. And his 
chaos becomes Levinas’s “pure susceptivity” (138). To present, reflectively or as a 
philosophical argument, the “chaos” of recurrent intensities and the affective opening of 
self that responds to another is impossible, becomes it thereby becomes a theme or a 
hypothesis. Yet Levinas takes up this strange challenge, proceeding with his own 
dramatique des phénomènes, his own paradigmatic method by which he opens an 
“otherly than being.” This is so called, because the question of being, as meaningful 
thematized existence, already assumes the minimal integration, and erasure, of affective 
forces and the chaos of sense fields. “The subject arising in the passivity of 
unconditionality,” writes Levinas, “in the expulsion outside its being at home with itself, 
is undeclinable.” In other words, it admits no modalizations, and cannot be refused. “[But 
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t]his undeclinability,” he adds, “is not that of transcendental subjectivity” (OBBE 139). It 
is not that Levinas rejects Husserl’s method, he transforms it instead into speculation. 
And it is speculation—on the dynamics of intersubjective affects and on the layers of 
passivity, already opened by Husserl. In my article, I try to show how he has taken up 
Husserl’s themes of affective Kräfte, his levels of chaos, and the questions posed by 
Husserl’s syntheses of association, whether these are contrastive or concordant and 
leading to fusion. (Let us recall parenthetically that, for Husserl, the intensity of affection 
is firstly a “function of contrast” (Hua XI, 149), rather than concordance or similarity. 
Disjunction, as difficulties in identification, would flow from the affections engendered 
by contrast.) After all, it is there, in the movement of affective forces, and between the 
spheres of our awakening and forgetting (Hua 11, 154), that Husserl will say, “it is a 
matter of a phenomenology of the ‘unconscious’ [des Unbewussten]” (Hua 11, 154). That 
is how far Husserl went—not officially, not in his published works—but in his 
meditations on spontaneous association in radical passivity. It is under this influence, I 
believe, that Levinas unfolded the suffering of recurrent affective memory and even the 
apperceptive disruption of face-to-face encounters with others. 
 Let me now come back to Husserl’s evolving approach to empathy. For, it is with 
passive synthesis that everything changed about Einfühlung. Much changed as well in 
Husserl’s approach to temporalizing consciousness. In the 1920s, in his notes on 
intersubjectivity, he thrust Einfühlung and Paarung, pairing, to their deepest intuitive 
levels, speaking even of “my” spontaneous “grasp” of the other’s internal tumult and 
psychic excitation (seine Kraftanspannung, evtl, seine Gemütserregung) (Hua 15, 472). It 
was through his radicalization of empathy and pairing that Husserl not only corrected 
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Lipps’s cognitivism, but dug as if beneath Hegel’s dialectic of desiring-negating 
consciousnesses. That is why Husserl could write, sounding somewhat like Merleau-
Ponty, “Instead of a juxtaposition [of two consciousnesses, ready to deny the in-itself of 
the other], we have to do with an interweave of sociality, which is clearly part of the 
meaning of the terms ‘master’ and ‘servant’… The action of the servant is not an isolated, 
simply private action, but rather an action taken in the awareness of the fulfillment of the 
voluntary requirements of his master; the order of the master is a will that is projected 
into the subjectivity of the servant…” (Hua 14, 402-403). 
In so far as the penetration of one will into another is plausible—and I think it 
shows up in many intersubjective situations, whatever the affective tones they take on— 
but in so far as Hegel’s agonistics are also probative, we seem to have a depth problem. 
Husserl’s example, unfolded at the transcendental level, opens a kind of typology, a 
certain universality. But Husserl’s paradigmatic scene belies a naïveté that Hegel’s does 
not. But what if Husserl’s projection of the will into another subjectivity wasn’t 
sometimes sooner a projection of desire, even a projection of helplessness—a kind of 
collapsed will, such as we find in the face of Levinas’s “widow, orphan, and stranger”? 
The point is that the merging of wills—a phenomenon of Einfühlung and spontaneous 
association—but eventually also mergings of passions, can find their extreme translation 
in Levinas’s “substitution,” which Levinas defined as an intentional transgression, an 
obsession that “goes against intentionality” (OBBE 111). Yet this event that “goes 
against intentionality” is also, maybe firstly, found in Husserl. And though he probably 
did not know of Husserl’s reworking the master-slave dialectic, Levinas too thought of 
Hegel when he thought of passivity and the chaos of passions. He wrote,  
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For the venerable tradition to which Hegel refers, for which the ego is equal 
with itself and consequently for which the return of the being to itself [is] 
concrete universality . . . when seen starting from the obsession of passivity, of 
the self, anarchical [without an archē], there emerges an inequality behind the 
equality of consciousness. (OBBE 115; trans. mod.)  
This inequality was explored by Husserl as a function of contrastive associations (Funktion 
des Kontrastes), one simple example of which was a “wahnsinniger Schmerz” [a 
maddening pain] (Hua XI, 415). This constituted but one form of “extreme contrast,” 
yielding enduring affective forces that flowed back and no doubt sedimented. But less 
physically, the seeming “equality of consciousness” that Levinas denounced in Hegel, 
shows inconsistencies in intersubjective encounters for Husserl. As Husserl argued in 1928  
 
Two data are given in the unity of consciousness according to an intuitive 
distinction and on the basis of which…in pure passivity…they ground 
phenomenologically a unity of resemblance as distinct appearances…. 
[However,] finer analysis shows that there is, here, in an essential manner, an 
intentional transgression that intervenes genetically…the moment the 
members of the pairing have become conscious together and distinctly. (Hua 
I, 142)  
 
 
Husserl seems to mean that the intentional consciousness—which, through the ray 
of its attention, slowly builds up the profiles of an object on the basis of the object’s self-
giving—intentional consciousness can somehow be transgressed. Little may happen to 
the “equality of consciousness” to itself in this transgression. Yet when the other is there, 
looking at me, an associative fusion or pairing occurs, called “reciprocal awakening.” 
And perhaps I may even lose myself as the ego pole of identifications in this face-to-face, 
when the spaces surrounding our two bodies merge.  
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I am speculating, but the proliferation of modes of passivity, the emphasis on types 
of association, including the near physical pairing that goes with Einfühlung, and the 
presence of affective intensities running along our chains of retentions, all this gives us 
the Husserl who influenced Levinas. From translating the fifth Cartesian Meditation, he 
was aware of the 1920s depths of Einfühlung, and even the possibility that affective 
chaos might not initially enter, associatively, into flowing transcendental consciousness, 
even if a systematizing consciousness eventually did prevail. I cannot summarize the 
arguments in the article here, not systematically anyway. But again, the purpose of the 
essay was to show how these ambiguities were taken up, re-modalized and sometimes 
radicalized, by Levinas, as the hermeneute of suffering investiture. I repeat that the 
starting points in matters of ethics were different for the two philosophers. And, from the 
material that I have been able to consult, I’m not sure that Husserl was all that interested 
in passions and suffering as they relate to ethics. Nevertheless, I hope I have discussed, if 
fast and chaotically, the four areas in which I see, in Levinas, a Husserlian who opened 
intersubjective Einfühlung and passivity to their underside, to the inequality-with-self of 
consciousness that comes to pass, in an instant, in intersubjective encounters and some, 
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